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INTRODUCTION
Same-sex relationships have been highly controversial for decades, with opponents using religion, tradition, and custom to justify
their positions. The rhetoric about same-sex marriage opens the door
to discussion of plural marriage, as the reasons to allow same-sex
couples to marry apply similarly to plural unions. In America, Fundamentalist Mormons remain the most prominent group to seek out
plural marriages, arguing that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause protects one’s right to a plural marriage. In the nineteenth
century case of Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court found
that there was no constitutional violation of one’s free exercise of
religion in banning plural marriage. Anti-plural marriage laws in
the religious context have been contested since then on a small scale
but have not gained the same traction as same-sex unions. This difference occurs because of the varying levels of discrimination faced
by each group. Immutability plays a crucial role in these differences.
415
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An immutable quality is out of one’s control and is (more or less) unchanged over time. Being gay is an immutable quality, which is why
laws discriminating against those who are gay are more sinister—
because the state is persecuting people for something over which
they have no control. The result is that arguably more people are
affected by anti-same-sex marriage laws than anti-polygamy laws.
In 2015, Obergefell v. Hodges finally legitimized same-sex
marriages. The Supreme Court ruled that marriage is a fundamental right that extends to all unions between two people, regardless
of their sex or gender. Justice Roberts dissented in this landmark
decision, suggesting that the majority had opened the door for plural
marriages. This is precisely what this Note will argue as well: since
Obergefell finds that the fundamental constitutional right to marriage extends to gay couples, this right also necessarily extends to
include plural unions. This Note argues that although the majority
opinion mentions that a legitimate union comprises of two individuals, this number was decided arbitrarily and without support, simply
to narrow the scope of legitimate marriages. This Note will show
that the constitutional arguments for legalizing same-sex marriage
apply fully to polygamous relationships. Part I will address foundational issues about polygamy and its history in America, comparing it
to perceptions of polygamy today. Part II will look at the monumental
case of Obergefell v. Hodges and derive from it a constitutional right
to plural marriages. Part III will focus on the impact and objections
that legitimizing plural marriages could lead to and the likelihood
of plural unions being recognized in this country.
I. POLYGAMY IN AMERICA
A. History of Polygamy in America
Polygamy refers to a marriage in which individuals have multiple spouses at the same time.1 This practice was not prevalent in the
United States until 1843, when Joseph Smith, Jr., founder of Mormonism, had a revelation concerning plural marriages.2 For the next
three decades, tensions arose between members of the Church of the
Latter Day Saints (LDS) and the Fundamentalist Church of the
Latter Day Saints (FLDS), the former which renounced polygamy,
1. Polygamy, MERRIAM-W EBSTER D ICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/polygamy [ http://perma.cc/6TUG-2N75].
2. Fundamental Mormon and FLDS Time Line, in M ODERN P OLYGAMY IN THE
U NITED S TATES: H ISTORICAL, C ULTURAL, AND L EGAL ISSUES xi (Cardell K. Jacobson &
Lara Burton eds., 2011).
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and the latter being a proponent of it.3 In this time, the government
passed laws outlawing the practice of bigamy, which is the legal term
for being legally married to more than one person at the same time.4
Members of FLDS believed that their religion allowed and endorsed
the practice of polygamy, and that therefore it was a practice that
was protected by the Constitution’s First Amendment, recognizing
the free exercise of religion.5
In 1878, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no First
Amendment violation in outlawing bigamy.6 The Court reasoned
that polygamy has a tradition of being “odious” to the West until the
establishment of the Mormon Church and has traditionally been
considered an “ofence [sic] against society.” 7 The Court honed in on
the intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights, stating that religious
freedom was never intended to prevent the state from enacting laws
in the sphere of marriage, which is an important feature of social
life.8 The Court emphasized that marriage is a civil contract in
which the government is a party,9 and while the First Amendment
does protect an individual’s right to form any religious opinions and
beliefs, this does not necessarily extend to practices.10 The Court
used examples of state prohibition on human sacrifices in the name
of religion and how the state can regulate religion when it concerns
social order and organization.11 The Court essentially argues that
laws exist to keep society in order and functioning cohesively.12 Allowing religious exemptions on conduct could lead to disastrous and
potentially violent results.13
Reynolds defined legitimate marriages as one between one man
and one woman, with sodomy (along with other acts, such as bestiality) being considered a “crime against nature.” 14 Sodomy specifically
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1878).
6. Id. at 166–68.
7. Id. at 164.
8. Id. at 165.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 166.
11. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (“Suppose one believed that human sacrif ices were a
necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrif ice? Or if a wife
religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her
belief into practice?” ).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 161–62; Crime Against Nature, B ALLENTINE’S L AW D ICTIONARY (3d ed.
1969).
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was a criminal offense15 across the country until 1961, when Illinois
repealed its anti-sodomy law.16 Other states followed, but the majority
of states retained their anti-sodomy laws.17 This resulted in constitutional challenges on the basis that these laws violated due process
because the definition of “crime against nature” was too vague.18 Over
the years leading up to Obergefell, many courts, including the Supreme Court, heard cases challenging anti-sodomy laws on the basis
of privacy and the right to choose one’s intimate associations.19 Finally,
in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court ruled that marriage, which has historically been found to be a fundamental right,20 also included gay
couples.21 It further found that it was a Fourteenth Amendment
violation to deny marriages to same-sex couples.22 The Court’s reasoning shows its awareness that same-sex couples have gradually become
more accepted over the course of the century. The Court says that
there has been a “shift[ ] in public attitudes” that has allowed samesex couples to lead more public lives than was possible for them in
the twentieth century.23 This is an acknowledgment that the laws
of the nation are linked to public opinion. The majority notes how
the Framers of the Bill of Rights could not perceive the issues that
future individuals would face, leaving us with the task of deciding
the scope of freedoms we give our citizens because “[t]he nature of
injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.” 24
The Court’s emphasis on societal and cultural changes is worth
noting. The Obergefell ruling means that for all the decades that
15. Charges to the Grand Jury, 2 Del. Cas. 168 ( Del. C.P. 1802).
16. Getting Rid Of Sodomy Laws: History And Strategy That Led To The Lawrence
Decision, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/getting-rid-sodomy-laws-history-and-strategy
-led-lawrence-decision [ http://perma.cc/YL5J-DMZC].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) ( holding that the
Defense of Marriage Act is an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty under the Fifth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by “impos[ing] a disability” on same-sex couples
by insinuating that those unions are “less worthy” ); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578–79 (2003) (noting that the criminal statute in question imposes a stigma on the
private domestic lives of same-sex couples rising to an Equal Protection violation);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 220 (1986) (f inding that same-sex sodomy was not
a fundamental right rooted in history and that the fact that the majority has decided it
is an immoral act is enough of a rational basis to support the law).
20. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390 (1978) (f inding that the right to marry
was a fundamental liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ( holding that depriving an interracial couple the
right to marry would be a violation of their liberty under Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause).
21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
22. Id. at 2588.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2598.
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same-sex couples were denied marriage, the state was infringing on
constitutional rights. This leads to a troubling conclusion: in order
for a fundamental right to be acknowledged, society must be comfortable with the right in question. This means that when we consider
plural unions, we must be sure that it is not because of personal
discomfort and prejudices that we deny people the fundamental
right to marriage. I will delve further into this analysis in Part II.
B. Polygamy in the Twenty-First Century
Though plural marriages are not recognized in this country,
participants in plural marriage avoid legal obstacles by having one
legal marriage and having “spiritual marriages” with the other individuals.25 These latter unions are not, and need not be, sanctioned
by the state.26 This has led to religious cohabitations, where individuals live together in marriage-like situations without seeking legal
legitimacy.27 The TV show Sister Wives explores a plural family in
Utah, comprised of Kody Brown and his four wives.28 The state of
Utah sued the Brown family for violating its anti-bigamy law.29 Utah
had defined bigamy to include purporting to marry or living with
someone other than the individual to whom one is married.30 At the
core of the case was religious cohabitation, which was also illegal
under that bigamy statute.31 The Court ruled that there was no
fundamental right to enter into a second marriage because the
practice of plural marriage does not have a deeply rooted history or
tradition in the Nation (in fact, there is a strong tradition against
it).32 However, the Court used Lawrence to say that the Browns also
have the right to choose the nature of their personal and intimate
relationships, especially in the home, and that the statute did not
satisfy the rational basis test under Lawrence.33 The Court stated
that the fact that adulterous cohabitation is not prosecuted, whereas
religious cohabitation would be, cuts against the state’s argument
that economic and social implications in religious cohabitation
25. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1198 ( D. Utah 2013).
26. Id. at 1181.
27. Id. at 1197.
28. Kody, TLC, http://www.tlc.com/tv-shows/sister-wives/bios/kody [ http://perma.cc
/XS4Y-7M8F].
29. Brown, 947 F. Supp. at 1170.
30. U TAH C ODE A NN. § 76-7-101(1) ( LexisNexis 1997).
31. Brown, 947 F. Supp. at 1178.
32. Id. at 1203 (citing State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 771 & n.20 (Utah 2006) (Durham,
C.J., dissenting)).
33. Id. at 1224–25.
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create a rational basis for them to prohibit it.34 Further, the statute
was facially neutral, but the state only prosecuted religious cohabitation.35 Additionally, the Court held that to “purport to marry”
under the statute, individuals must have sought state recognition
of their marital status. Merely having a spiritual ceremony without
eliciting the state does not rise to that level.36 All of this culminated
in a finding that the cohabitation prong of Utah’s anti-bigamy
statute was unconstitutional under the substantive due process
clause from Lawrence.37
On a policy level, this also indicates a growing comfort with the
idea of polygamous relationships, and a greater deference of the idea
that an individual’s private life is a space in which the state should
not intrude. Just as the Court in Brown used Lawrence as the basis
to find a violation of a fundamental right, Part II will show that
Obergefell is the basis on which to find a fundamental right to
plural marriages.
C. Comparing Same-Sex Relationships and Polygamy
The next section goes into detail regarding Obergefell and the
implications for polygamy. Before this, we must compare same-sex
relationships to polygamous ones, and in doing, so we can reveal
how similar (or not) both practices are. In many respects, both sodomy
and bigamy share a common history, eventually diverging in modern times.
1. Pre-Twentieth Century
In the eighteenth century, sodomy was illegal.38 At that time,
sodomy included bestiality and anal sex, and while the punishment
for these acts was death, that was rarely enforced.39 Unlike current
discourse surrounding sodomy, it was not characterized as anti-homosexual, as this concept did not emerge until the late nineteenth century (that is not to say that homosexuality itself did not exist).40
34. Id. at 1218.
35. Id. at 1210.
36. Id. at 1231.
37. Brown, 947 F. Supp. at 1225.
38. Charges to the Grand Jury, 2 Del. Cas. 168 ( Del. C.P. 1802).
39. W ILLIAM N. E SKRIDGE, J R. , DISHONORABLE P ASSIONS: SODOMY L AWS IN A MERICA,
1861–2003 2–3 (2008).
40. Id. See also Margot Canaday, The Strange History of Sodomy Laws, A LTERN ET:
S EX & R ELATIONSHIPS (Sept. 16, 2008, 2:00 PM ), http://www.alternet.org/story/99092/the
_strange_history_of_sodomy_laws [ http://perma.cc/9X8S-NGYG].
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Some suggest that these laws aimed at promoting sex for procreation
purposes,41 and that the change in how these laws have been perceived in modern times, as anti-homosexuality, is more of a byproduct
of our urbanization and a change in how we talk about and perceive
sexuality.42 During the nineteenth century, the aforementioned
Reynolds case found that there was no constitutional violation of the
First Amendment in the prohibition of polygamous unions for Mormon groups.43
2. Post-Twentieth Century
In the twentieth century, discourse about same-sex relationships took a much larger space in the public than polygamy. This
may be attributed to the fact that those who sought plural unions
have traditionally been Mormon sects who can settle for religious
unions rather than legal ones and still live as a family. Conversely,
same-sex couples could not do that. Same-sex relationships did not
receive the same marital legitimacy as heterosexual couples had.
Same-sex intercourse was targeted in Bowers44 and Lawrence.45 In
the former, the Supreme Court found that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer a fundamental right to
consensual homosexual sodomy.46 The Court reasoned that (1) private acts between adults are not constitutionally insulated from
state intrusion; (2) homosexual sodomy is not a practice deeply rooted
in tradition; and (3) it is only in very narrow circumstances that the
Court should expand the reach of the Due Process Clause.47
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF POLYGAMY AND A
COMPARISON TO OBERGEFELL
A. Obergefell: The Catalyst for Polygamy
The landmark case, Obergefell v. Hodges, confirmed a fundamental right to marriage in this country that extends to same-sex
couples under the Fourteenth Amendment.48 The Court found that
marriage is a fundamental right because: (1) individual autonomy
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See E SKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 4.
See Canaday, supra note 40.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–68 (1878).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
Id.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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and the right to make personal choices are fundamental concepts,49
as seen in Loving50 and Lawrence,51 that apply to choosing a spouse
to spend one’s life with; (2) it supports a two-person union that has
unparalleled importance to the individuals in the partnership,52 as
was central in Griswold;53 (3) it protects children and families in
important ways that affects child-rearing, procreation, and education, additionally providing stability to children;54 and (4) the United
States has a deeply rooted tradition of marriage and it is an essential component to our social order.55
Though the case was not ruled by using the Equal Protection
Clause, Justice Kennedy does mention this avenue for finding the
fundamental right to same-sex marriages.56 Being gay or lesbian is
an immutable trait because an individual has no choice over his or
her sexual preferences.57 We can compare this to anti-miscegenation
laws that criminalized interracial marriages.58 In Loving, the Court
held that restricting marriage on the basis of race violated the Equal
Protection Clause because measures that restrict rights of citizens
on the basis of race violate the Clause’s central meaning.59 The Court
noted that “[m]arriage is one of the basic civil rights of man,” and
that it is “fundamental to our very existence and survival.” 60
The Loving decision echoes Obergefell. Chief Justice Roberts’
dissent in Obergefell argues that the majority uses the number “two,”
with respect to the number of people in the union, in a manner that
is random.61 He states that while the majority explains why marriage
is a fundamental right, it provides no reasoning for why this aspect
is preserved, and the man-woman aspect is not.62 He asks, if, as the
majority states, it is a matter of dignity to allow two men or women
to exercise their autonomy to make the profound choice to be married, “why would there be any less dignity in the bond between three
49. Id. at 2599.
50. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
51. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).
52. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) ( holding that the Constitution protects the right of married couples use contraception).
54. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
55. Id. at 2599–2601.
56. Id. at 2590.
57. Id. at 2594. The Court could have found in favor of same-sex unions by referring
to the Equal Protection Clause. If one’s orientation is immutable, the same-sex marriage
ban would fail for the same reason that the anti-miscegenation laws did.
58. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id.
61. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621.
62. Id.
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people who . . . seek to make the profound choice to marry?” 63 He
continues to propose that if it is disrespectful to gay and lesbian
couples to deny them marriage, it is also disrespectful to individuals
in plural unions to prevent them from legalizing their marriages.64
B. Standards of Review
In order to make the legal argument for the fundamental right
to plural marriages, it is necessary to ascertain what standard of
review must be applied.65 This standard decides what level of “suspicion” will be balanced against deference to the state that created the
law.66 For example, in the context of racially discriminatory laws
created by a state, the level of scrutiny is strict (because race is an
immutable quality and has been a historical source of discrimination), and therefore, the state is given less deference, and the law is
likely struck down.67 The different standards of review, from most
likely to strike down a law to least, are: strict scrutiny (e.g., race68),
critical examination (e.g., marriage69), intermediate scrutiny (e.g.,
gender70), “rationality review with teeth” 71 (same-sex relationships72),
and rationality review (e.g., hippies73 ).
Considering same-sex marriage, the majority opinion in Obergefell
does not make clear what the standard of review for evaluating the
right to marry should be. In fact, the bulk of the dicta focuses on the
emotional reasons for same-sex marriage and how important marriage is to people on a human level.74 Kennedy, who wrote the
majority opinion, included that there was a liberty interest under
the Equal Protection Clause (EPC) implicated in the denial of samesex marriage,75 on top of the violation of the Due Process Clause
63. Id. at 2621–22.
64. Id. at 2622.
65. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that different levels of review should be used when different rights are implicated by legislation).
66. Id.
67. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
68. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
69. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
70. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976).
71. The author uses “rationality review with teeth” to refer to a review standard more
stringent than rational basis but less than intermediate scrutiny. Jeremy Byellin,
Tackling the Most Important Topics of Law School, Part 6B: Rational Basis, “With
Teeth,” and Intermediate Scrutiny, L EGAL S OLUTIONS B LOG (Sept. 5, 2013), http://blog
.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-school-1/tackling-important-topics-law-school
-part-6b-rational-basis-teeth-intermediate-scrutiny [ https://perma.cc/JHC7-KWVR].
72. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
73. See United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
74. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
75. Id. at 2604.
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(DPC) of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 These two different violations point to different levels of scrutiny (addressed in the next
subsection). The decision not to clearly outline the standard of review
may have been strategic so as not to draw firm lines: Kennedy may
have been strategically avoiding expanding the scope of marriage by
limiting the analysis provided in the decision. In prior cases, when
the Court has decided what standard of review applies in a case,
later courts have used that as precedent for their own cases. For
example, once the Court established that laws that discriminate on
the basis of race get strict scrutiny, most subsequent cases dealing
with race in a similar manner get the same treatment as the precedent. Therefore, it is possible that to avoid expanding the scope of
the right to marry and creating bright line rules that could lead to
future litigation, the Court avoided a clear legal standard.
When a fundamental right is at stake, the Court will apply a
stricter standard of suspicion on the law. If an Equal Protection
issue is at stake, then we focus the analysis on the individual rather
than the “right” at stake, and more deference is given to the state.
1. Strict Scrutiny Standard
The fundamental right to marry is implicated in Obergefell and
in the context of plural marriages.77 When a fundamental right is
burdened, the Court will apply a “strict scrutiny” evaluation.78 A
higher standard of review applies because the Court is suspicious of
the state impinging on one’s fundamental right, something core to
one’s individual liberty.79 When this analysis applies, the Court
looks at whether the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government purpose.80 There is an inherent presumption against the
state in a strict scrutiny analysis (because a fundamental right is at
stake), so the burden is on the state to prove its case.
Since Obergefell dealt with what it claimed was a fundamental
right, a strict scrutiny analysis applies. Under such analysis, and in
order to be consistent with the Court, the outcome should be that a
state’s ban on same-sex unions will be struck. In this case, the government proposed certain interests, which can be analyzed under
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2594.
78. Emanuel Francone, Strict Scrutiny, L EGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny [ http://perma.cc/RU65-DQSZ].
79. Id.
80. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (stating that when fundamental rights
are involved, the state can only justify the infringement by showing a compelling state
interest); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (stating that the
means by which the government implements legislation that affects constitutional rights
may not be unnecessarily broad).
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the strict scrutiny standard and will ultimately be found not compelling enough:
(1) In question is a fundamental right and it would be hasty to
make a decision without more public discussion.81
The Court rejects this for two reasons. First, extensive deliberation and discussion of same-sex unions has already taken place,
with countless debates, litigation, and scholarly work, showing the
presence of a great deal of information and public rhetoric on the
issue.82 Second, individuals should not have to wait for the legislature to assert their fundamental rights.83 The Court also noted that
individuals are able to invoke their fundamental rights even if the
public at large disagrees with their right and the legislature refuses
to act.84 To some extent this is ironic, as the Court has essentially
waited until the public has more or less accepted same-sex unions
to recognize a fundamental right in this space.85
We can apply this to the plural marriage context as well. This
topic has been extensively written about as well and litigated since
early in this country’s history.86 Also applicable in this context is
that individuals asserting their fundamental right, here to marry
more than one individual, should not have to wait for the public or
legislature to recognize that they have been deprived of a right.
(2) Allowing same-sex couples to marry will harm the institution of marriage, as it is counter to convention and tradition.87
The Court responds that though the concept of marriage is old,
its history is one of “continuity and change.” 88 It explains how our
understanding of basic concepts has evolved over time, encompassing societal norms and new understanding.89
Within this line of reasoning exists the notion that there are
likely legal rights that we do not recognize today that we may in the
future. Same-sex marriage is a fundamental right that we only began
to recognize across the nation in 2015, but it existed as an unacknowledged fundamental right before that point. Additionally, at
the time the Court ruled, thirteen states still did not view same-sex
unions as legitimate,90 and it was controversial even in the states
81. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2615.
86. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–68 (1878).
87. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
88. Id. at 2595.
89. Id.
90. Julia Zorthian, These are the States Where SCOTUS Just Legalized Same-Sex
Marriage, T IME M AG. (June 26, 2015), http://time.com/3937662/gay-marriage-supreme
-court-states-legal [ http://perma.cc/S22D-BE6T].
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that did. Had we waited for the legislatures in those thirteen states
to be comfortable with the notion of same-sex marriage, a supposed
fundamental right would have been suppressed even further. These
assertions apply to the plural marriage context as well. The fact that
marriage has looked a certain way in history does not mean that it
cannot be expanded further to encompass “new” relationships. Tradition cannot bar the recognition of unconventional unions.
(3) In Obergefell, petitioners are not seeking to exercise their
right to marriage but are trying to create a new right.91
To this, the Court counters by stating that the right exercised
is not the right for same-sex couples to marry but simply the right
to marry.92 They analogize this to other cases where individuals
sought to exercise their right to marry in general.93 The Court points
out that rights should not be defined by who has exercised them in
the past because this would automatically keep things as status quo
and prevent new groups from invoking those rights as well.94
With respect to plural unions, this means that we need not
focus on the individual asserting the right. No “new right” is being
created here; instead, just as with Obergefell, Loving, and Turner,
it is just an invocation of an already existing right.
(4) Allowing same-sex marriage will lead to a decline in the
number of opposite-sex couples marrying because it “severs the
connection between natural procreation and marriage.” 95
The Court rejects this vehemently. It says that the decision to
marry and raise children is based on many personal and intimate
considerations, and that these are not affected by same-sex couples
getting married.96 The Court also notes that the rights here are
between two consenting adults who want to enter into a marriage
that poses no risk of harm to either party or to others.97
The state’s contention also fails because it suggests that marriages where procreation is not possible are less legitimate. This
would mean that even heterosexual couples that marry when either
party is impotent or barren, or couples that do not want children,
cause other couples to avoid marriage and/or procreation altogether.
This is an illegitimate concern because states do not police married
couples to ensure they are procreating, nor does the state mandate
91. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
92. Id.
93. Id. (noting that cases like Loving did not ask about the right for interracial
couples to marry, and Turner did not ask about the right of inmates to marry—both
looked at the broader right to marry).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2606–07.
96. Id.
97. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
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that procreation is a condition of their marriage license. So, this
concern does not apply to the plural marriage context either because
whether or not the individuals in the marriage can procreate is not
dispositive to the issue of plural marriage—whether or not one
chooses to marry or have children remains a private and personal
decision. The Court emphasized that marriage is between the people
inside the marriage and does not affect other marriages.98 This is
true for plural unions as well. The adults that consent to the union
are the only ones affected by it, and the fact that others may marry
does not impact the very serious and personal decision other couples
make when contemplating marriage and children.
(5) Some religions do not condone same-sex marriage, and people
adhering to their faith-based beliefs have a First Amendment right
to teach the principles central to their core beliefs, such as what the
structure of a family should be.99
The Court agrees that religious beliefs are protected under the
Constitution, but that this also means that proponents of same-sex
marriage because of their religious or secular beliefs are also protected.100 The State cannot use religious faith to, on one side, protect
couples of the opposite sex, and then, on the other side, shun samesex couples—the law must apply equally on both ends.
This idea of religious freedom is basic to our American liberties
and should extend to plural marriage as well. In one respect, faithbased polygamy should be protected under the free exercise of religion. This has already been litigated with the Court, holding that
while an individual has the right to the free exercise of religion, this
cannot trump the law of the land.101 The Court drew a line between
state interference with religious beliefs (prohibited) and its interference with practices (permissible).102 This line of reasoning is, to some
extent, sound. We would not want to allow faith-based murders or
sacrifices, even if we respect one’s right to have a personal belief of
any kind. A line must be drawn somewhere.
However, the line need not be drawn in front of polygamy. As
discussed in the previous section, homosexuality was also considered
immoral at the same time the Reynolds case was litigated, yet we
now allow same-sex marriage. If marriage licenses are not considered an unsafe practice, does it matter to whom we are extending it?
The case for plural marriage is not about recognizing a new religious
belief; it is simply about extending an already existing mechanism
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
Id. at 166.
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to more individuals. Giving individuals in plural unions the ability
to marry would still not validate a religious belief in murder or
sacrifice that are abhorrent to our society.103 A new right is not
being created; an existing and already qualified one (marriage
comes with certain rights and privileges, but these do not obviate
laws already in place) is being extended further without inherently
being changed.
Moreover, just because one has a religious belief that polygamy
is wrong does not mean that they can impose their belief on someone else. Religious beliefs can be used as shields, to protect one from
having to perform acts that are harmful to their religious sensibilities. These beliefs cannot be used as swords, to regulate other people’s conducts. The simplest way to explain this is that one has the
right to condemn same-sex marriage because they may believe it is
antithetical to their religious beliefs. They have a constitutional
right to believe that it is immoral, and the Constitution then protects them from having to enter into same-sex unions. But, they
cannot project their religious beliefs on others. Similarly, religious
condemnation of polygamy is irrelevant if it is part of the fundamental right to marry. If one is against it, their remedy is to not enter
into a plural union.
It is clear from the above analysis that the state was unable to
show a compelling enough reason under the doctrine of strict scrutiny to prohibit same-sex marriage, and since they did not meet
their burden, the law was struck. The reasons offered against expanding the scope of marriage may also apply to the plural marriage
context, and as the analysis above shows, these would not hold up
under the high bar. When a fundamental right is at stake, the state
is not given deference unless it can show compelling reasons and a
narrowly tailored law. Since the state is unable to provide compelling reasons against plural marriage, the ban fails the strict scrutiny standard and is struck.
It is necessary to compare the case for plural marriage to other
cases that also deal with the fundamental right to marry, as this
can help articulate the standard of review more clearly.
In Loving, the Court dealt with Virginia’s anti-miscegenation
laws.104 It noted that marriage is one of the basic civil liberties, and
is “fundamental to our . . . existence and survival.” 105 The Court also
found that the State had failed to meet its burden showing that
there was a compelling reason for this fundamental right to be
103. See infra Part III.
104. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
105. Id. at 12.
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limited.106 Most importantly, the Court held that racial classifications were invidious and subversive to notions of equality and that
they cannot stand as reasons to restrict marriage.107
But Loving dealt with race in the context of marriage, making
it a more clear case of strict scrutiny than plural marriage. However,
the case still stands for the proposition that marriage is fundamental
to our existence,108 and therefore, laws that curtail this fundamental
right must be given the highest standard of scrutiny. Anti-polygamy
laws, in the above analysis, do not meet the high bar and therefore
these laws should be struck.
So, because laws about marriage concern a fundamental right,
strict scrutiny applies. I have shown through the above analysis
that the compelling reasons against same-sex marriage also apply
to bigamy and that they have been found not compelling. Therefore,
plural unions should be protected as a fundamental right and offered the highest scrutiny.
Despite this, it is not as intuitive that plural unions should be
protected because the “victims” are different. In Loving, a black and
white couple was targeted because of their race,109 and in Obergefell,
couples were targeted because of their sexualities.110 Both of these
cases concern immutable qualities, whereas bigamy does not implicate an immutable quality. Additionally, the discrimination faced by
polygamous couples does not rise to the same level as the discrimination faced by racial minorities and members of LGBTQUIA communities. More individuals suffer because of their racial and sexual
identities, largely because there are more individuals in both implicated groups than there are polygamous groups. The population of
minorities in America, those who may be discriminated against on
the basis of race, is approximately seventy-four million,111 and the
population of LGBT individuals in America is approximately five
million.112 By contrast, there are an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 polygamous individuals.113 The vast difference between the number of
individuals affected in each group, coupled with the fact that polygamy
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 12.
109. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
110. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015).
111. U.S. C ENSUS B UREAU, Q UICKF ACTS (2016), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/fact/table/US/PST045216 [ http://perma.cc/S2EV-YH8W].
112. Brian W. Ward et al., Sexual Orientation and Health Among U.S. Adults:
National Health Interview Survey, 2013, 77 N AT’L H EALTH S URV. R EP. 1, 7 tbl. 1 (2014),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr077.pdf [ https://perma.cc/JFD3-YRX4].
113. Samantha Allen, Polygamy Is More Popular Than Ever, D AILY B EAST (June 2,
2015, 5:15 AM ), http://www.thedailybeast.com/polygamy-is-more-popular-than-ever
[ http://perma.cc/J29Z-CCVW].
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is not immutable or visible explain why we may be less sympathetic
to polygamous couples.114
2. Critical Examination Standard
Since anti-bigamy laws do not impinge on any immutable quality, a strict scrutiny standard is not appropriate for this issue. A
lesser standard is critical examination, where the state must show
sufficiently important interests and a law that is closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests.115
In Zablocki, the Court considered a statute that prohibited someone who is in arrears in child support from being able to marry.116
The Court cited Loving to contend that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance, and that since the legislation in question
interferes with the exercising of that right, the Court must apply a
“critical examination” of the state’s interests.117 The Court said that
though the state does have an interest in ensuring children are
supported, the statute would not further or encourage that end, and
so it is not narrowly tailored enough.118 Though the state was preventing a petitioner to marry when in arrears, it did not also funnel
money from him to the children which would have been the way to
deal with its interest in protecting children.119 The Court also stated
that although Loving was about racial discrimination, it was confirming that the right to marry is a fundamental one.120 Zablocki is
a good example of a case that implicates the fundamental right to
marry without also involving other historically discriminatory
practices (like those involving race or homosexuality), so it is better
suited to make the point about whether bigamy should be protected.
The analysis of reasons against polygamy above would apply here
as well, showing that the state has no sufficiently important interest
to justify its ban. An important interest for the state could be that the
state wants to control what marriage looks like, as they have historically have done. But this would go against the ruling in Obergefell
which does not afford states the opportunity to define marriages in
a way they believe is suitable. Since the critical examination standard
114. Immutability necessarily plays a part in this differential. More people have been
affected by racially restrictive or anti-LGBT legislation. For example, a white man could
not have a legal plural union, but could walk on any side of the street or sit anywhere
on the bus. By contrast, a black man could not do either of the aforementioned things,
and LGBT individuals have been denied services and bathroom access by enacted laws.
115. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
116. Id. at 390.
117. Id. at 383.
118. Id. at 388.
119. Id. at 389.
120. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
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is lower than that of strict scrutiny, anything that passes the highest
level must also pass this lower one. Additionally, as we have seen with
race and homosexuality, what is considered important or compelling
may change over time, just as the social norms do. Previously, keeping the practice of monogamy itself, in the form of a union between
a man and a woman, would have been an important state interest.
The argument is that our laws, such as family and property laws, are
based on a premise of a monogamous union.121 But this is a flawed
argument. If a fundamental right is at play, mere inconvenience to
legislatures in changing the law or dealing with new administrative
work, does not outweigh the gravity of depriving a basic right to
one’s existence. Certainly there were plenty of laws created when
slavery was still the norm in our country, but no one today would
argue that the complicated web of laws created on the premise of
slavery is a reason to deny people their basic liberties.122 A counter
to that is that the ability to marry is not denied, as consenting
adults may marry other consenting adults equally. However, the
burden is on the state to show why this qualification must exist.
Why is it not that any number of consenting adults can choose to
marry? Another commonly offered reason is the protection of children.123 Studies have shown that the more unrelated people within
a relationship, the greater the risk of abuse, violence, and homicide.124 In a polygamous relationship there will be unrelated individuals, like in the Brown family, where the union is composed of four
wives and children who are not related to every parent in the relationship. However, this same concern would exist in step-parent-child
situations too, and remarriage happens with much more frequency
than plural unions.125 Laws against child abuse and neglect already
exist to protect children in those situations, regardless of whether it
is a remarriage situation or a plural union one. Protection of children cannot be the reason to ban plural unions. Without an important interest, the ban on bigamy fails the critical examination test
as outlined in Zablocki.126
121. Jonathan A. Porter, L’Amour for Four: Polygyny, Polyamory, And the State’s Compelling Economic Interest in Normative Monogamy, 64 E MORY L.J. 2093, 2115 (2015).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2117.
124. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, The puzzle of monogamous
marriage, 367 P HIL. T RANSACTIONS R OYAL S OC’Y B 657, 664–65 (2012).
125. Compare GRETCHEN L IVINGSTON, F OUR-IN-T EN C OUPLES ARE SAYING “I D O,”
A GAIN, P EW R ESEARCH C TR. (2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/11/14/four-in
-ten-couples-are-saying-I-do-again [ http://perma.cc/QL3D-N2GT], with Nate Carlisle,
Think Mormon offshoots have the most polygamists in U.S.? Think again, S ALT L AKE
TRIBUNE (Apr. 15, 2016, 7:18 AM ), http://www.sltrib.com/blogs/3779255-155/think-mormon
-offshoots-have-the-most [ http://perma.cc/G23Y-X4JM].
126. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
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In cases like Zablocki, courts also cite a right to privacy in the
context of marriage127 arising out of Griswold.128 In Griswold, the
state was attempting to restrict a couple’s ability to obtain counsel on
the use of contraceptives, and the Court considered whether the Constitution offered the couple a right to marital privacy from the state.129
The Court found absurdity in the idea of policing marital bedrooms to
see whether contraceptives are being used.130 The Court also described
marriage as “a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring . . . . It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony in living, not political faiths. . . .” 131 Though the Court was
not considering plural relationships, the ethos behind the sentiment
about marital privacy should still apply to polygamous marriages.
In some ways, this association is permitted whether or not the
state recognizes it. People may live with multiple partners, though
only one of those relationships may have a marriage license. But if
that is the case, then this applies equally to same-sex marriages
which we now recognize. Same-sex couples could previously live as
a married couple, just without the state recognition, but we reject
this compromise to marriage equality. Legitimizing their unions came
with a host of other benefits. One such benefit is a spouse being able
to list their same-sex spouse on their property titles, so that when
one spouse dies, the surviving spouse automatically gets 100 percent
of the property and avoids the probate or intestate succession processes which can be costly and time consuming.132 Why should this
not also apply to plural marriages? Saying that the relationship can
still exist and that it simply won’t be recognized by the state is no
longer a justification against same-sex marriage. Perhaps this should
apply in the context of plural marriages as well.
Assuming the argument that polygamous families can exist without legal recognition, it is worth noting that some states have anticohabitation laws that could interfere with this.133 This was the type
of law in question in the Brown case, where the Supreme Court of
Utah struck down the state’s anti-cohabitation law that specifically
targeted plural families and not more “conventional” cohabitation.134
127. Id. at 394.
128. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
129. Id. at 480.
130. Id. at 485.
131. Id. at 486.
132. Brittany Blackburn Koch, The Effect of Obergefell v. Hodges for Same-Sex Couples,
N AT’L L AW R EV. (July 17, 2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/effect-obergefell
-v-hodges-same-sex-couples [ http://perma.cc/V9Q7-YNSE].
133. Housing, U NMARRIED E QUAL., http://www.unmarried.org/housing [ http://perma
.cc/9E3P-CBB6].
134. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1234 ( D. Utah 2013).
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That case involved a husband and his three wives with whom he
lives as a family unit.135 He has only one legal marriage, and the
rest are spiritual.136 The Court ruled that the state cannot prohibit
religious cohabitation and allow every other type of cohabitation to
go unpunished.137
3. Intermediate Scrutiny
The next level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny. This typically applies in the context of gender classifications and stereotypes138
so does not apply to the case of plural unions.
4. Rationality Review with Teeth
This standard of review is a variant of Rationality Review (below)
and is applied by courts to protect vulnerable groups under a more
lax standard. This has been used in cases involving the mentally
handicapped139 and also for same-sex couples.140 Polygamous families have faced stigma and may be classified as a vulnerable group.
Under this standard of review, the court looks at the purpose behind
the law. If the purpose rests on an irrational fear or prejudice, then
it is illegitimate and will be struck under rationality review with
teeth. In the Cleburne case, the Court found that prejudice against
the mentally ill was not legitimate.141 Romer dealt with a state’s antidiscriminatory laws, where the Court struck the laws because it
deemed them to have the illegitimate purpose of prejudicing gay
individuals.142 Polygamous couples could argue that the state’s purpose
behind enacting certain laws is prejudicial and based on an invidious
motive. However, in the example offered above, being mentally handicapped is not a choice, just as being gay is not either. Polygamous
families do not have to change something fundamental to their existence as those groups would have to. It is difficult, legally and even
morally, to say that the experience of being gay is akin to that of
135. Id. at 1178.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1210.
138. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979) ( looking at whether
a Massachusetts law that gives preference to male veterans over female ones was an
unconstitutional and discriminatory practice); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208–10
(1976) (noting that a law that had different legal alcohol consumption ages for men and
women is an impermissible gender classification based on stereotypes); Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484, 486 (1974), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (investigating whether
disability insurance harms pregnant women and perpetuates stereotypes about women).
139. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
140. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
141. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
142. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
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being polygamous. Polygamy is more about conduct than status,
whereas one’s race, gender, orientation, or mental health is about
an inherent quality of one’s self.143 This points to polygamous families as nonvulnerable and likely inappropriately evaluated under
this standard of review. Also, the courts have been otherwise reluctant to expand what could be defined as a suspect class (like those
of a certain race, gender, mental capacity, orientation etc.) In the
Lee Optical case, the Court refused to find that ophthalmologists
were a sufficient suspect class.144 All these reasons point to finding
that rationality review with teeth would not apply. However, this
does not affect our earlier findings of a right to plural unions because the cases that adopted rationality review with teeth did not
concern fundamental rights like we have with polygamy.145
5. Rationality Review
This is the lowest standard of review, where the analysis looks
at whether the state has a discriminatory purpose, and if so, whether
the law in question is rationally related to achieving a legitimate
government purpose. The analysis is more or less the same as
rationality review with teeth, except that the “victims” may not be
typically vulnerable groups. A legitimate government purpose may
not have any bare animus or intent to target an unpopular group.
An example of the application of this standard is in the Moreno
case.146 There, the Court found that a law that was created to target
hippies was bare congressional harm to a politically unpopular
group.147 Another case that applies this standard is the Clover Leaf
case, where milk sellers challenged a Minnesota law that banned the
retail sale of milk unless it was packaged in specific materials (paper
rather than plastic).148 In its decision, the Court deferred to the
legislative and factual findings and held that there was a theoretical
fit between the purpose and the execution, and so the law may stand
under the test.149
143. The Court has previously held that the government cannot criminalize behavior
that is a product of their status (over which they have no control) rather than their
action (over which they may exercise control). See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444
F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006).
144. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
145. Though, I would argue that if Romer was litigated in today’s post-Obergefell
society, it would come out differently due to the social attitudes toward gay individuals
that exist today as opposed to ten years ago when Romer was decided.
146. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
147. Id. at 537–38. The law prevented one from getting food stamps if they lived with
a nonfamily member, and it was clearly meant to be applied to hippies specif ically.
148. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 458–59 (1981).
149. Id. at 470.
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It is not conclusive whether the government has a discriminatory
purpose behind the bigamy laws, to target a specific group. It seems
that certain groups may be affected because our laws against bigamy
are the way they are, rather than that the laws around bigamy were
created to target plural unions. But, assuming that the government
has a discriminatory purpose, we can evaluate the laws under the
rationality review test. The government, arguably, has a legitimate
purpose, since marriage has traditionally been the purview of state
law to regulate and is the basis for many other laws (family law, property law, etc.), and, whereas under the “critical examination” standard the state’s interests were not important enough, here the bar
is much lower. Still, because a fundamental right is at stake, unlike
the right to get food stamps or sell milk in plastic containers, the
purpose would not be legitimate enough to trump such a basic right.
In summary, plural unions can be evaluated under the different
standards of review, but two of them are most appropriate to this conversation. Strict scrutiny applies because marriage is at stake and
is a fundamental right. For the same reasons that Obergefell was decided, bans on plural unions should be struck under the standard.
Stepping down to the lower critical examination standard, bans on
plural unions would be struck. And, as polygamy does not implicate
an immutable quality, this is probably the best standard to apply here.
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST POLYGAMY
This section of the Note will move away from the legal arguments
and focus on the policy issues surrounding polygamy. Though, as
stated, not technically “legal,” we have seen time and time again how
policy considerations make and break laws. For example, new social
awareness of identities such as race and sexuality resulted in Brown
and Obergefell. Policy drives laws and lawmakers, and that is why
understanding the policy concerns for polygamy illuminates whether
its legalization is something we may ever see. The Note will address
the dangers of polygamy, its benefits, and a feminist perspective.
A. Dangers of Polygamy
The typical gut reaction to polygamy paints it as abhorrent and
dangerous. Our preconceived notions are based on our socialization
in the Western world, where the dominating religion is Christianity150
150. P EW R ESEARCH C TR., G LOBAL C HRISTIANITY: A R EPORT ON THE S IZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE W ORLD’S C HRISTIAN P OPULATION 9 (2011), http://www.pewforum.org/2011
/12/19/global-christianity-regions [ http://perma.cc/T2VB-G52L].
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and where monogamy rules. Somehow, polygamy is less romantic and
in many cases dangerous, feelings likely conceived from and exacerbated by sensationalized groups such as the Fundamentalist Latter
Day Saints (FLDS), discussed below. That is not to say that these
fears are baseless, and this section explores the typical arguments
from danger, countering them with the benefits that can be realized
from plural unions.
In State v. Green, the court stated that the practice of polygamy
“often coincides with crimes targeting women and children.” 151 This
deductive leap could have been based in part on the particular defendant, who had, on top of his polygamous marriage, been convicted
of rape of a thirteen-year-old and criminal non-support as well.152
Similarly, the FLDS case with Warren Jeffs portrayed polygamy as
a sinister world, ripe with sex with underage girls.153 Another narrative in the same vein is the case where leaders of the Apostolic
United Brethren were convicted on child molestation charges.154
These examples are undoubtedly abhorrent, but key to note is that
these are examples of (1) religion used as a tool to coerce and (2)
breaking laws that protect vulnerable groups. With respect to the first
point, in those cases, religion was used as a tool to commit the crimes,
as opposed to criminal activity based on religious doctrine.155 The fact
that religion was intimately involved in these heinous acts does not
mean that its religious doctrines encourage such behavior or that the
usual practice of the religion involves these crimes. This is a point
that is often ignored. To explicate this, consider the example of a Muslim terrorist. A Pew Research Center study estimated that in 2015
there were 1.8 billion Muslims in the world,156 and that most Muslims
are vehemently against suicide bombings and violence against civilians.157 Other studies indicate that there is an estimated range of
151. State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004).
152. Id. at n.14.
153. Jeffs v. State, No. 03-11-00568-CR, 2012 WL 1068797, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App.
Mar. 29, 2012).
154. Maura Irene Strassberg, Symposium: Can We Still Criminalize Polygamy: Strict
Scrutiny of Polygamy Laws Under State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts After Hobby
Lobby, 16 U. ILL. L. R EV. 1605, 1620 n.106.
155. See, e.g., Clayton Sandell & Erin McLaughlin, Warren Jeffs Prosecution Rests After
Playing Audio Sex Tape, ABC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/warren -jeffs
-rape-trial-hears-audio-girls-alleged/story?id=14221603 [http://perma.cc/6CR7-EBHW]. The
videos show that Jeffs used religious rhetoric as he sexually assaulted his “spiritual wives”,
telling the girls they were “property of [their] husband’s kingdom and the Kingdom of God
on Earth”. Id.
156. P EW R ESEARCH C TR., T HE C HANGING GLOBAL R ELIGIOUS L ANDSCAPE 8 (2017).
157. Michael Lipka, Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world,
P EW R ESEARCH C TR. (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09
/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world [http://perma.cc/5XET
-P45H].
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85,000 to 106,000 Muslim extremists,158 and a basic calculation leads
to the conclusion that, at most, 0.0000059 percent of Muslims in the
world are extremists who may do harm. However, in this country
the fear of Islamic extremists is very high.159 What this suggests is
that those who commit criminal acts are doing so despite their religion, since the vast majority (almost all) retain their faith and do no
harm.160 It is illuminating to compare this figure to the number of
Christian-American “terrorists” that have committed acts of violence on U.S. soil, which is arguably much higher,161 but the fear of
Christian terrorists is not at all on par. This discrepancy is suspect
and shows that there are other areas where we are prone to exaggerating dangers without acknowledging the facts and where we give the
benefit of the doubt to groups in power (e.g., Christian-Americans).
We see this with the Catholic Church, which has consistently come
under fire over the years for inappropriate relationships with children.162 The Vatican revealed that since 2004, it had defrocked 848
priests and sanctioned 2,572 priests for various levels of abuse, molestation, and rape of children.163 But, Catholicism is still a respected
and widely followed religion.164 The point is that when it comes to
the faith of the majority, we are able to parse out the difference between faith-based criminal acts and criminal acts where religion is
misused. For the minority religions like Islam and Mormonism, the
same logic should be applied.165 We must hold all religions accountable the same way.
Returning to the prior discussion about concerns of heinous
conduct against vulnerable groups, such as in Green, the FLDS, and
158. Peter Bergen & Emily Schneider, Jihadist threat not as big as you think, CNN
(Sept. 29, 2014, 8:33 AM ), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/26/opinion/bergen-schneider-how
-many-jihadists [ http://perma.cc/Z3WZ-ZAT2].
159. Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment
-west.aspx [ http://perma.cc/25RE-PE9G].
160. See Lipka, supra note 157.
161. See Aurelie Corinthios, How Many Terrorist Attacks in the U.S. Have Been
Carried Out by Immigrants from the 7 Banned Muslim Countries?, P EOPLE: P OLITICS
(Jan. 29, 2017, 10:00 AM ), http://people.com/politics/donald-trump-refugee-muslim-ban
-terrorist-attack-us-statistics [ http://perma.cc/64CV-B8V8].
162. Vatican facing U.N. showdown on sex abuse record, CBS N EWS (Jan. 15, 2014,
10:03 AM ), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/vatican-facing-un-showdown-on-sex-abuse-record
[ http://perma.cc/ENG2-6777].
163. Vatican reveals how many priests defrocked for sex abuse since 2004, CBS N EWS
( May 7, 2014, 10:14 AM ), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/vatican-reveals-how-many
-priests-defrocked-for-sex-abuse-since-2004 [ http://perma.cc/PN5D-3BY7].
164. The Global Catholic Population, P EW R ESEARCH C TR. (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www
.pewforum.org/2013/02/13/the-global-catholic-population [ http://perma.cc/PFQ7-Z2LS].
165. My Note does not make an argument for religious polygamy, but the criticisms
of polygamy generally arise out of the religious examples, specif ically Mormonism, which
is why I address these concerns.
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the Apostolic United Brethren, these groups broke pre-existing laws
that were created to protect vulnerable members of society. Laws
against child abuse, molestation, and rape already exist. No exception exists in any group or religious sect that allows for children to
be abused in any capacity.
Even assuming that the incidence of child abuse and neglect are
increased in polygamous homes, society applies this concern for safety
of vulnerable individuals very selectively. Approximately forty to
fifty percent of American marriages end in divorce,166 and approximately twenty-three percent of adults currently married have been
married before.167 Further, tens of millions of children are involved
in these relationships.168 The National Center for Health Research
found that in families where the father is not biologically related to
the children in the home, Child Protective Services is more likely to
be contacted about abuse.169 Given the aforementioned rates of marriage, divorce, and remarriage,170 the dangers of abuse exist. While
this is the case, marriages are not scrutinized to reduce the potential
for abuse. We do not vet individuals who remarry with the presumption that a child in the family is going to be abused. But the concern
is a real one as 700,000 children are abused annually.171 Where are
the protests against remarriage then? Why are people not advocating
against divorcees with children that want to date? All of these
situations lead to a statistically proven increase in the risk of child
abuse, but plural families bear the brunt of the criticism.172
This section serves to show that many major religions have bad
actors, yet, we do not write off all of these religions as bad. Additionally, concerns of abuse in the home are only used to prevent plural
marriages and not other (traditional) marriages that are statistically also likely to result in incidents of abuse.
166. Marriage & Divorce, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/topics/divorce
[ http://perma.cc/WWH3-VJPB].
167. L IVINGSTON, supra note 125, at 4.
168. S TEP F AMILY S TATISTICS, S TEP F AMILY F OUND., http://www.stepfamily.org/step
family-statistics.html [http://perma.cc/CAE6-KA3W]. The Foundation notes that approximately 30 million children under the age of 13 are living with one biological parent and
their partner.
169. Diana Zucherman, PhD, & Sarah Pedersen, Child Abuse & Father Figures: Which
Kind of Families Are Safest to Grow Up In?, N AT’L C TR. F OR H EALTH R ESEARCH,
http://www.center4research.org/child-abuse-father-f igures-kind-families-safest-grow
[ http://perma.cc/RN65-MGTQ].
170. Henrich, Boyd & Richerson, supra note 124; L IVINGSTON, supra note 125.
171. National Statistics on Child Abuse, N AT’L C HILDREN’S A LL., http://nationalchild
alliance.org/media-room/media-kit/national-statistics-child-abuse [ http://perma.cc/C5D3
-H8TH].
172. Also, the plural families or sects in question were clear extremists and not the norm.
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B. Benefits of Polygamy
One of the benefits of polygamy is the creation of a much larger
support system.173 Extended families can be beneficial to a child’s
development, specifically members like grandparents.174 This important relationship is cultivated better when grandparents are in a
quasi-parent or substitute parent role.175 From this, we can interpret that a child benefits from multiple parental figures in his or
her life—and that is exactly what polygamy offers. Children in
plural families have a greater support system, made up of multiple
“parents” and likely more siblings as well.
This support system benefits the adults in the relationship as
well. When one parent is struggling, whether emotionally, professionally, or otherwise, there are others to pick up the slack for them.
A woman who is in a plural family highlighted this very benefit.176
When she was experiencing postpartum depression, her husband
and “sister wives” helped her get her life back on track.177 During
these times, they also gave her children all the love and attention
she was unable to give them.178 If the focus is supposed to be on the
child and its physical and emotional well-being, it would seem that
the state would encourage family structures, like polygamous ones,
that would ensure that a child does not miss out on love and care
because one parent is struggling.
Studies indicate that in any given year, 16 million American
adults, mostly women, suffer from Major Depressive Disorder.179
This Disorder can make it difficult for people to continue their daily
routines and function normally.180 The prevalence of this Disorder,
and the fact that many other mental health related disabilities, illnesses, and disorders exist, suggest that children have a heightened
likelihood of being around parents that may be unable to take care
of them or themselves. With this in mind, it becomes more important
to have other members in the family to support the parent and child.
Plural unions have this support built into their inherent structure.
173. I am referring to the theoretical, non-religious practice of polygamy.
174. Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 C ONN. L. R EV. 1315, 1323 (1994).
175. Id. at 1324.
176. Vicki Darger, A Real Sister Wife Speaks Out: Why I Chose Polygamy, H UFFINGTON P OST: T HE B LOG (Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.huff ingtonpost.com/vicki-darger/real
-sister-wife-chose-polygamy_b_991552.html [ http://perma.cc/L3A8-RKAG].
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Facts & Statistics, A NXIETY & D EPRESSION A SS’N OF A M. (Aug. 2016), https://
www.adaa.org/about-adaa/press-room/facts-statistics [ http://perma.cc/VTP7-WMDQ].
180. Depression, A NXIETY & D EPRESSION A SS’N OF A M., https://www.adaa.org/under
standing-anxiety/depression [ http://perma.cc/ZT97-U429].
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Rather than going to a grandmother, the child can stay in his or her
usual environment with his other mother or father. The lack of
disruption is an important consideration, if, like states typically
claim, the welfare of children is at the helm of their concerns.
The fear of children in danger (1) is a pre-existing problem in
two-person unions, and states do not presumptively prevent individuals from forming romantic relationships with people not biologically related to their children; (2) polygamy does not create new
dangers the law does not already address; and (3) polygamy is able
to offer unique benefits to children and families.
C. Feminist Perspective
A major critique of polygamy is that its manifestation tends to
be polygynous (one husband to multiple wives). This asymmetry
understandably leads people to the conclusion that it is unfair to the
women in the relationship. This Note addresses the “hierarchical
structure” that polygamy creates, the potential dehumanizing conservativism that could be attached to this family structure, and the
emotional toils that could occur.
As mentioned previously, one of the concerns with polygamy is
the sexist power dynamic that is purportedly created in a polygamous
family structure, but sexism is generally rampant and is not exclusive
to polygamy. If our reason for making polygamy impermissible is that
it is a sexist family structure, we are committing to then police all
people that get into relationships. A sexist structure can be prevalent
in any conservative household, if encouraged by religious doctrines
or personal beliefs. Additionally, even with the absence of religion,
there is nothing to prevent a family dynamic where a man takes
charge and dictates what happens in the home. While this sexism critique is valid, it is more of a social commentary applicable broadly
than a criticism of polygamy specifically. We do not require that all
relationships meet a standard of gender equality (even if that is what
we aspire for). This applies equally to the dehumanizing conservatism
to which alluded to earlier. We do not stop Orthodox Catholics, who
may believe that a man’s place is at the head of the household, from
marrying whosoever they wish.181
The emotional toil of sharing a partner might be compelling, if
this was a unique problem that does not already exist today. While polygamy may in some ways legitimize (legally speaking) a romantic
181. Bishop Nicholas, The Role of Women in the Orthodox Church, ANTIOCHIAN ORTHODOX C HRISTIAN A RCHDIOCESE OF N. A M., http://www.antiochian.org/role-women-orthodox
-church [ http://perma.cc/BP8B-SVGK] (discussing the differing roles for men and women
in the Church).
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relationship with a third individual; truthfully this happens anyway:
extramarital affairs and cheating generally. Outlawing polygamy,
as has been the status quo, has certainly not prevented cheating in
any way.
CONCLUSION
Many of us have the same gut reaction to polygamy—unease.
It is important to realize two things: (1) that this was the reaction
people had to black folk, women (in the workplace), gay individuals,
and more recently, trans individuals and (2) we should think hard
before writing off polygamous marriage, especially in light of
Obergefell. The Supreme Court has held, in Obergefell and going as
far back as Loving, that marriage is a fundamental right and an
issue of personal autonomy in an intimate space in our lives. While
we may not want certain things for ourselves, our discomfort shouldn’t
dictate the lives and liberties of others.
When we think back to cases such as Dred Scott and Plessy, where
we reduced humans to property because of skin color and declared
that separate can somehow be equal, our reaction should be shame
and confusion that it took us so long to realize something basic.182
While there are clear differences to polygamy, namely the quality of
immutability, once we have found a fundamental right we have the
duty to protect it. In not doing so, we diminish hard fought cases such
as Loving and Obergefell,183 simply because we just do not feel like
it right now.
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